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INTRODUCTION

When Governor George Ryan commuted the death sentences of
every inmate on Illinois' death row,' the reactions were predictable.
Death penalty opponents applauded the Governor's action. 2 For
them, the system of capital punishment in Illinois was broken and
sorely in need of repair.3 Indeed, at the time of the Governor's
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A., 1987, Colgate University; M.Phil., 1989,
Oxford University; J.D., 1992, Yale Law School. I thank John Blume, Sheri Johnson, and
Steve Shiffrin for comments on a previous draft and John Peter Rickgauer for exceptional
research assistance. I would also like to thank the participants at the 2004 Annual
Meeting of the Society for the Study of Law, Culture, and the Humanities for their
comments, and Austin Sarat for inviting me to present the paper on that occasion.
1. The Governor commuted the death sentences of three inmates to imprisonment of
forty years and 164 inmates to life imprisonment without parole. See Maurice Possley &
Steve Mills, Clemency for All, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, § 2, at 1. He pardoned four other
death-row inmates whom he believed had been wrongfully convicted. See id. The largest
single grant of clemency prior to Governor Ryan's was that of Governor Richard Celeste,
who granted clemency to eight of the 109 inmates on Ohio's death row in 1991. See
Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital
Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REv. 289, 298 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Clemency Adds Fuel to Death Penalty
Debate, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 2003, § 1, at 1 (quoting officials from the Innocence Project,
the Center for Death Penalty Litigation, and the NAACP).
3. The claim that Illinois' capital sentencing system was "broken" echoes the title of
the recent study by James Liebman and his colleagues analyzing the rate of legal error in
capital cases and the sources of such error. See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System:
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, at 1 (2000) [hereinafter Liebman et al., Broken
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commutations, an inmate sentenced to death in Illinois was more
likely to be exonerated than executed.4

Some predicted the

Governor's action might even prompt smaller states to abandon the
death penalty.' In an era when granting clemency to any death-row
inmate is a rare event,6 the Governor showed unusual political

courage, albeit on the eve of his departure from office.
Prosecutors and victims' families lamented the Governor's
decision.7

Although the Governor earlier said he would consider

granting clemency to everyone on Illinois' death row,8 nine days of
emotionally charged hearings with victims' families reportedly pushed
him away from the idea. 9 Thus, far from being courageous, the

Governor's final action was seen in some quarters as a betrayal. 10 It
would have been one thing to commute some, or perhaps even many,
death sentences after a searching inquiry into the facts of each case.
But blanket commutation was another thing altogether. 1 Some
victims said2 the decision had denied them the closure they sought in
1

execution.
The Illinois Constitution provides that the "Governor may grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all

offenses on such terms as he thinks proper."13 A letter from some
System], availableat http://justice.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport/liebman2.pdf. Liebman and
his colleagues found that capital convictions and sentences are reversed at an average rate
of sixty-eight percent. See James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in
CapitalCases, 1973-1995, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000) [hereinafter Liebman et al.,
CapitalAttrition].
4. At the time of Governor Ryan's decision, thirteen death-row inmates had been
See Governor George Ryan, Speech at
exonerated; twelve had been executed.
Northwestern University College of Law (Jan. 11, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
5. See, e.g., Mills & Possley, supra note 2 (citing expert opinions stating that smaller
states may abandon the death penalty in light of the Governor's action).
6. See, e.g., Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 1, at 304 (stating that "[c]lemency in a
capital case is extremely rare, particularly in light of the high number of inmates whose
death row status makes them eligible for such mercy").
7. See John Keilman, Murder Victims' Families Feel Twice Betrayed by Ryan, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, § 1, at 17; Mills & Possley, supra note 2.
8. See Steve Mills, Life-or-Death Debate Rages at Hearings, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16,
2002, § 1, at 1.
9. See Christi Parsons & Steve Mills, Ryan Backs Off Blanket Clemency, CHI. TRIB.,
Oct. 23, 2002, § 1, at 1.
10. See Keilman, supra note 7; Abdon M. Pallasch et al., Gov. Ryan Empties Death
Row of All 167, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 2.
11. See Keilman, supra note 7.
12. See id.
13. ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12. For overviews of the rules and procedures governing
executive clemency in various jurisdictions, see James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, May
God--or the Governor-Have Mercy: Executive Clemency and Executions in Modern
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four hundred law professors assured Governor Ryan that mass
commutation was well within his authority. 14 Indeed, no one seriously
claims the Governor lacked the legal authority to act as he did." Nor
is legal authority the question I wish to pursue here. The question I
pursue is that of moral legitimacy.
I should emphasize at the outset that I do not wish to assess the
morality of the reasons the Governor himself offered in defense of his
action. Nor do I assess the morality of his action tout court. My focus
is on the morality of mercy, which is the virtue commonly associated
with the exercise of clemency. The question I pursue therefore comes
down to this: Is it morally legitimate for a governor to use the

clemency power to commute the death sentences of everyone on a
state's death row in the name of mercy?

6

Or to put it another way,

can mercy morally justify blanket commutation?
Mercy is typically defined in relation to retribution. Retribution
demands that an offender receive the punishment he deserves, no
more and no less. Mercy is understood as the partial or complete
remission of deserved punishment. Mercy therefore tempers the
demands of retributive justice." I argue below that retribution can
Death-Penalty Systems, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 200, 216-29 (2000); Clifford Dorne & Kenneth
Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive Justice: Interpretationsfrom a NationalSurvey
of Executive Clemency Procedures,25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413,

427-40 (1999).
14. See John McCormick, Letter Prods Ryan on Clemency, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 2002,

§ 2, at 1.
15. The Supreme Court of Illinois recently rejected a challenge to the Governor's
action in People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 804 N.E.2d 546 (Ill. 2004). The court
nonetheless took the occasion to share its view that the clemency power was intended to
be used "to prevent miscarriages of justice in individual cases." Id. at 560. The court
made no mention of mercy.
16. I should also emphasize that my focus is on what role, if any, mercy may
legitimately play within a theory of punishment. I do not consider the role mercy may
legitimately play within a theory of political morality. I do not, for example, ask if a mass
commutation like that of Governor Ryan can be justified on the ground that it might serve
as a spark to a healthy democratic debate over the morality of capital punishment or as a
way to spur legislative reform of the process through which it is administered. See Mills &
Possley, supra note 2 (reporting that "death penalty opponents hope that once the
immediate fury among supporters of capital punishment fades, Ryan's actions and the
many reforms he had urged will prompt a greater debate on one of the nation's most
divisive social issues"). Some of Governor Ryan's remarks suggest that spurring reform
was at least one of the reasons for his decision. See Possley & Mills, supra note 1 ("Asked
if he considered that he had saved so many lives, Ryan told a reporter, 'I never thought of
that .... My goal was to improve a broken system in Illinois.' ").
17. This way of framing the problem defines mercy in relation to positive retributive
justice, according to which the state is obligated to impose on an offender a specific and
identifiable punishment that he deserves, no more and no less. Justice and mercy
necessarily conflict on this view because justice means giving an offender the punishment
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embrace one or both of two distinct theories of mercy.18 But neither
of these theories can justify commuting the sentences of everyone on
death row.
If retributive theories of mercy were the only ones available,
then decisions like those of Governor Ryan would be difficult to

justify in the name of mercy. But they are not the only theories
he deserves, while mercy means giving him less punishment than he deserves. The
problem can be framed in at least three other ways.
First, justice is understood here to be non-disjunctive-it requires a specific and
identifiable punishment. Others have argued, however, that justice is disjunctive-it
specifies a range of deserved punishments, with a high end and a low end. On this view,
any punishment less than the maximum justice allows can be characterized as merciful.
Moreover, any such punishment is not only merciful, but also just, insofar as it falls within
the range of deserved punishments. Accordingly, the conflict between mercy and justice
evaporates. See Nathan Brett, Mercy and CriminalJustice: A Pleafor Mercy, 5 CAN. J.L.
& JURIS. 81, 94 (1992); H. Scott Hestevold, Justice to Mercy, 46 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 281, 281 (1985). But see Andrew Brien, Mercy and Desert, 20
PHIL. PAPERS 193, 196-97 (1991) [hereinafter Brien, Mercy and Desert] (rejecting this
argument for reconciling mercy and justice because the concept of "disjunctive desert" on
which it rests is "incoherent"); George Rainbolt, Mercy: In Defense of Caprice, 31 NOOS
226, 229-30 (1997) ("It seems that one cannot deserve two or four years for a crime. This
seems as odd as a student whose work in a class deserves either an A or a C.").
Second, mercy might be defined in relation to negative retributive justice,
according to which the state has the right, but not the obligation, to impose on an offender
the punishment he deserves. On this view, mercy and justice do not conflict, because the
state does not act unjustly when it shows mercy. It has simply waived a right; it has not
violated any duty. See Sterling Harwood, Is Mercy Inherently Unjust?, in CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 464, 464-65 (Michael J. Gorr & Sterling Harwood eds., 1995) (defending
this view); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162, 175-76 (1988) (defending this view in the
context of the "private law paradigm"). However otherwise attractive, this approach
would seem vulnerable to all the criticisms directed more generally at the negative
retributivism on which it depends. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 90-91 (1997) (criticizing negative retributivism).
Third, mercy might be defined not in relation to justice, but in relation to power.
Thus one might say that "an act of mercy is an action in a relationship of vulnerability and
power in which a powerful person intentionally reduces or removes altogether a threat to
or the present suffering of another." Andrew Brien, Mercy Within Legal Justice, 24 SOC.
THEORY & PRAC. 83, 85 (1998) [hereinafter Brien, Mercy Within Legal Justice];see also
Rainbolt, supra, at 228 ("No analysis which defines mercy in terms of the relief of deserved
suffering can account for all cases of the virtue."). On this view, too, mercy and justice
need not conflict. If a person has the power to reduce another's suffering, his doing so is
an act of mercy. But if justice required him to reduce the other's suffering, his act is also a
just one. A single act can therefore be both just and merciful. But where, as here, the
focus is on the role of mercy within the context of law, mercy is better understood in
relation to justice, not power. After all, the same act can be both merciful and just only if
an actor has the power to act unjustly. Surely, however, the law cannot confess to giving
those who act in its name the power to act in an unjust manner, or at least in a manner
they know to be unjust.
18. As will become clear below, only one of these theories qualifies as a true theory of
mercy. The other is a theory of justice dressed up as mercy. See infra Part II.A.
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available. On the contrary, I want to suggest yet another theory of
mercy, one which comes into view only when we abandon retribution
in favor of a different theory of punishment, which I call punishment
as atonement. According to this theory, deserved punishment is
understood not as an end in itself (as in retribution) but as a
necessary step in a process through which an offender makes amends
for his wrongdoing and thereby becomes reconciled with those he has
wronged. Unlike either of the theories associated with retribution,
this alternative theory of mercy can offer a plausible justification for
commuting death row.
My argument unfolds in three parts. Part I introduces the
concept of mercy. 9 It describes mercy's relationship to retributive
19. The literature on mercy is large and growing.

For examples of literature

discussing mercy, see generally KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY,

AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989); Brett, supra note 17; Brien, Mercy and Desert, supra
note 17; Andrew Brien, Mercy, Utilitarianism and Retributivism, 24 PHILOSOPHIA 493
(1995); Brien, Mercy Within Legal Justice, supra note 17; Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81
PHIL. REV. 182 (1972); Emilios A. Christodoulidis, The Irrationality of Merciful Legal
Judgment: Exclusionary Reasoning and the Question of the Particular,18 LAW & PHIL.
215 (1999); Ross Harrison, The Equality of Mercy, in JURISPRUDENCE:

CAMBRIDGE

ESSAYS 107 (Hyman Gross & Ross Harrison eds., 1992); Harwood, supra note 17; H. Scott
Hestevold, Disjunctive Desert, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 357 (1983); Hestevold, supra note 17;
Carla Ann Hage Johnson, Entitled to Clemency: Mercy in the Criminal Law, 10 LAW &
PHIL. 109 (1991); Carla Johnson, Seasoning Justice, 99 ETHICS 553 (1989); Stephen
Kershnar, Mercy, Retributivism, and Harsh Punishment, 14 INT'L J. APPLIED PHIL. 209
(2000); John Kleinig, Mercy and Justice, 44 PHIL. 341 (1969); Jeffrie G. Murphy,
Forgiveness, Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall
1988, at 3; Murphy, supra note 17; Jeffrie G. Murphy, Repentance, Punishment,and Mercy,
in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, CHARACTER, LIBERTY, AND LAW:

KANTIAN ESSAYS IN

THEORY AND PRACTICE 59 (1998) [hereinafter Murphy, Repentance]; Martha C.
Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1993); A.T. Nuyen, Strainingthe
Quality of Mercy, 23 PHIL. PAPERS 61 (1994); Lyla O'Driscoll, The Quality of Mercy, 21
S.J. PHIL. 229 (1983); George Rainbolt, Mercy: An Independent, Imperfect Virtue, 27 AM.
PHIL. Q. 169 (1990) [hereinafter Rainbolt, An Imperfect Virtue]; Rainbolt, supra note 17;
H.R.T. Roberts, Mercy, 46 PHIL. 352

(1971); Mary Sigler,

The Story of Justice:

Retribution, Mercy, and the Role of Emotions in the CapitalSentencing Process, 19 LAW &
PHIL. 339 (2000); N.E. Simmonds, Judgment and Mercy, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 52
(1993); Alwynne Smart, Mercy, 43 PHIL. 345 (1968); Daniel Statman, Doing Without
Mercy, 32 S.J. PHIL. 331 (1994); James Sterba, Can a Person Deserve Mercy?, 10 J. SOC.

PHIL. 11 (1979); Steven Sverdlik, Justice and Mercy, 16 J. SOC. PHIL. 36 (1985); P.
Twambley, Mercy and Forgiveness,36 ANALYSIS 84 (1976); Nigel Walker, The Quiddity of
Mercy, 70 PHIL. 27 (1995); George Rainbolt, Mercy, Justice and the Death Penalty (May

19, 2003) [hereinafter Rainbolt, Mercy and the Death Penalty] (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Jeffrie Murphy deserves much of the credit for the recent interest in mercy among
lawyers and legal philosophers. His work draws on that of Alwynne Smart, Claudia Card,
and P. Twambley. For critical reviews of Murphy's analysis of mercy, see generally
Andrew Brien, Saving Grace, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1990, at 52; R.A.
Duff, Justice, Mercy, and Forgiveness, 9 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1990, at 51;
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justice and explains why mercy is reputed to be a problematic and
puzzling virtue. Part II presents two accounts of the role of mercy
within a theory of retributive punishment, arguing that neither can
readily justify commuting death row in mercy's name. Part III
presents an account of the role of mercy within a theory of
punishment as atonement, arguing that this account, unlike either of
the retributivist accounts, can successfully defend a governor's
decision to commute death row in mercy's name.
I. MERCY'S DILEMMA

We usually think of mercy as a virtue whose exercise tempers the
demands of justice. We also usually think of mercy as a gift or act of
grace. But the fact that mercy is supposed to be all these things leads
to a dilemma and calls into question mercy's status as a genuine
virtue.
First, consider the fact that mercy tempers justice. Retributive
justice obligates the state to punish an offender because and to the
extent, but only to the extent, he deserves to be punished." The
punishment an offender deserves is usually thought to be some
function of his culpability or of his culpability combined with the
harm he has caused. 2' Either way, the state cannot shirk its obligation
to do justice. It must impose on each offender the punishment he
deserves. But if the state extends mercy to an offender, it has not
punished him to the full extent he deserves to be punished. In order
to temper justice, mercy must therefore tamper with it.22 But if that is
so, if mercy countenances injustice, then why should we believe mercy
23
is a virtue?
Second, consider the fact that mercy is a gift. As such, mercy is
Herbert Morris, Murphy on Forgiveness, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1988, at 15;
Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be Wrong?,
88 MICH. L. REV. 1448 (1990) (book review).
20. More precisely, positive retributivists believe the state has an obligation to punish
those who deserve to be punished. See R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work
in the Philosophy of Punishment, in 20 CRIME & JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 7

(Michael Tonry ed., 1996). Negative retributivists believe the state has a right to punish
those who deserve to be punished but it has no obligation to do so. See id.
21. Compare Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
1, 30 (1994) (arguing that desert depends on culpability alone), with Michael S. Moore,
The Independent Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237, 280-81

(1994) (arguing that desert depends on culpability and harm).
22. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 167 ("Temperings [of justice] are tamperings [with
justice].").
23. See Rainbolt, supra note 17, at 226 (describing this problem as the "dilemma of
mercy").
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thought to be free from the demands of equality or equal treatment.
Imagine, for example, two defendants similarly situated in all relevant
respects. Both have been sentenced to death, which is (let us assume)
the punishment each deserves. If a governor elects to show mercy to
one, but not to the other, he has treated them unequally. But this
unequal treatment provides the unlucky defendant with no grounds
for complaint. He has been assigned the punishment he deserves, and
so long as we believe mercy is a gift to which no one is entitled, it
does not matter that one offender has been treated unequally
compared to the other. But if that is so, if mercy countenances
unequal treatment, then why, once again, should we believe mercy is
24
a virtue?
In short, we say that mercy is a virtuous gift that tempers the
demands of justice. Yet it turns out that mercy conflicts with justice
and equality. But what kind of virtue does that? Common intuitions
about mercy therefore give rise to a dilemma: on the one hand, we
believe mercy is a virtue, but on the other, we are left wondering what
kind of virtue mercy can be if it conflicts with justice and equality.
This way of framing the dilemma suggests two ways out of it.
First, one could argue that mercy remains a virtue because it does not
in fact conflict with justice or equality. Second, one could argue that
mercy remains a virtue despite conflicting with justice and equality.
These two answers to mercy's dilemma, both of which locate mercy
within a retributive theory of punishment, generate what I will call
retribution's two theories of mercy.
II. RETRIBUTION'S MERCY

Retribution's first theory of mercy asserts that mercy does not in
fact conflict with justice or equality. Its second theory asserts that
mercy is a virtue despite conflicting with justice and equality. For
reasons given below, I call the first theory mercy as equity and the
second mercy as imperfect obligation. Whatever their intrinsic merits,

neither theory can provide a very convincing justification for a
governor's decision to commute the sentences of everyone on death
row in the name of mercy.
A. Mercy As Equity
One approach to the dilemma of mercy sees mercy as a way of
remedying instances of injustice inevitably arising within any criminal
24. See id. at 227 (describing this problem as the "problem of relevant difference").
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justice system. This approach begins from the premise that justice,
including retributive justice, is achieved in law through rules. For
example, the fair application of the rules for administering the death
penalty would ideally separate out the guilty from the innocent and
those who deserve death from those who do not. Securing justice is
therefore a simple matter of following the rules.
But the idea that justice can be realized through rules has at least
two problems. The first is practical. Sometimes the rules are not
followed. Sometimes the process designed to separate the guilty from
the innocent breaks down, as sometimes does the process intended to
separate those who deserve death from those who do not. These
breakdowns have many causes.
Prosecutors sometimes decide,
consciously or unconsciously, to seek the death penalty because of the
defendant's or victim's race,2" despite their obligation to seek
impartial justice.26 They also sometimes suppress evidence pointing
to a suspect's actual or legal innocence,2 7 despite their constitutional
obligation to turn over such evidence.28 Defense lawyers sometimes

do a poor job defending their clients,29 despite their obligation to
render effective assistance. 0

When these failures occur, the right

25. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discriminationand the Death Penalty in the
Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from
Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 app. B at 1742-44 (1998) (collecting all thenavailable studies examining the influence of race in capital sentencing). For the latest
published work of Baldus and his colleagues examining the influence of race in Nebraska's
capital sentencing system, see generally David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002).
26. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-1.2(c) (1993) ("The

duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely convict.").
27. See, e.g., Liebman et al., Broken System, supra note 3, at 40 (noting that nineteen
percent of the reversals of capital convictions or sentences in state court and eighteen
percent of those in federal court were due to prosecutorial failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence or other forms of prosecutorial misconduct).
28. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that "the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
29. See, e.g., Liebman et al., Capital Attrition, supra note 3, at 1839-41 (noting that
thirty-nine percent of the reversals of capital convictions or sentences in state court and
twenty-seven percent of those in federal court were due to incompetent lawyering and
ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The
Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835,
1837 (1994) (describing the "pervasiveness of deficient representation" in capital cases).
30. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (articulating the prevailing
standard governing Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 4-1.2(b) (1993) ("The basic duty defense
counsel owes to the administration of justice and as an officer of the court is to serve as the
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result might still be reached, albeit through an unfair process; or, the
wrong result might be reached. The wrong man might be convicted
or the right man unjustly punished.
Appeals give a defendant the chance to show his conviction was
obtained, or his sentence determined, in violation of the rules. But
appellate judges make mistakes, too. Moreover, the appeals process
is concerned not only with fairness to the defendant. It has
competing concerns, such as efficiency and federalism. 31 These
competing concerns generate rules of appellate and post-conviction
procedure that predictably allow otherwise meritorious appeals to go
unheard.32
The second problem runs deeper, inherent as it is in any system
of rules. For even if the rules and the application of them were
flawless, justice cannot be achieved through rules alone. Rules are
both over-inclusive and under-inclusive with respect to the principles
standing behind them.3 3 Even if we assume that the rules capital
jurors follow to determine a defendant's sentence are designed to
produce a retributively just result,' 4 those rules will inevitably

produce unjust results from time to time. Any set of rules will force a
juror to ignore facts to which he would otherwise attend if he were
accused's counselor and advocate with courage and devotion and to render effective,
quality representation."); id. at 4.1-2(c) ("Since the death penalty differs from other
criminal penalties in its finality, defense counsel in a capital case should respond to this
difference by making extraordinary efforts on behalf of the accused.").
31. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000) (stating that federal courts "shall entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court" but "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States"). For an overview of recent
developments in the law of habeas corpus, see Larry W. Yackle, Capital Punishment,
FederalCourts, and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH
PENALTY 58-93 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
32. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991) (holding that the
filing of notice of appeal one day late in state court resulted in a default of underlying
claims in both state and federal court).
33. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 135 (1991)
("Rule-based decision-making ... entails an inevitable under- and over-inclusiveness, and
accepting a regime of rules necessitates tolerating some number of wrong results-results
other than those that would have been reached by the direct and correct application of the
substantive justifications undergirding the rule.").
34. This assumption is counterfactual because capital jurors are typically free to
consider utilitarian factors, most notably a defendant's future dangerousness, as well as
retributive factors related to the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the
offender. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-97 (1983) (recognizing future
dangerousness as a constitutionally legitimate aggravating factor in capital sentencing);
People v. Jackson, 793 N.E.2d 1, 13-14 (Ill. 2001) (recognizing future dangerousness as a
legitimate aggravating factor under Illinois law).
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attends to all the relevant facts. Rules do not.
Now, capital sentencing is not an especially rule-bound process.

Judges and juries deciding between life and death have broad
discretion. They are free to consider a wide range of facts bearing on
the circumstances of the offense and the culpability of the offender.35
The rules governing capital sentencing are thus less likely to block
access to relevant facts compared, for example, to the rules governing
non-capital sentencing under the federal sentencing guidelines.36 Still,

insofar as the process of capital sentencing does block access to
relevant facts, the resulting sentence may be unjust.
Here is the point at which retribution's first theory of mercymercy as equity-comes into play. According to this theory, mercy is
a remedial mechanism. When the applicable rules produce injustice,
mercy is summoned to correct the problem. It serves to produce the
result the rules should have produced in the first place.3 7 Mercy is
thus seen as a form of equity, which is the name justice assumes when
unmediated by rules.
On this view, mercy's dilemma disappears.

Mercy does not

conflict with justice because mercy is not really a virtue separate and
distinct from justice at all. Nor does mercy deny equality because

mercy, as a form of justice, is no less committed to treating like cases
35. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding
that a state cannot preclude a capital sentencing jury from considering "any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense .. . proffer[ed]
as a basis for a sentence less than death"). In fact, insofar as the mitigating facts and
circumstances available to a capital jury under Lockett encompass facts and circumstances
belonging to the domain of mercy as distinct from that of justice, governors may refuse to
consider those facts because the sentencing jury has already considered and rejected them.
It is unclear, however, whether the authority jurors have to determine a defendant's
sentence includes the authority to show mercy. Nor is it clear whether, or to what extent,
jurors themselves see their task as an occasion for the exercise of mercy. For thoughts on
these and related questions, see generally Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from
Heaven ": Mercy in CapitalSentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989 (1996).
36. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1957 (1988) (explaining that the federal
sentencing guidelines, unlike the guided discretion model of capital sentencing, do not
"permit the sentencer to consider the full range of individual characteristics relevant to
mitigating the severity of punishment in a particular case").
37. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 19, at 129 ("[P]ardons provide a way of making sure
that justice is served."); see also Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting
the PardoningPower from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 581 (1991) (agreeing with
Moore that "the principle of deserts . .. [is] the primary consideration in analyzing the
clemency power" but disagreeing "with her ultimate conclusion that the only justifiable
acts of clemency are those which further justice by meting out what the particular
individual deserves").
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alike than is justice itself. Thus, far from opposing the demands of
retributive justice, mercy serves them. Of course, this answer to
mercy's dilemma does come at a price. Because it reduces mercy to a
form of justice, this theory cannot explain the widespread intuition
that mercy is indeed a virtue separate and distinct from justice.
Retribution's first theory of mercy is therefore a theory of justice in
disguise.
If one listens to the reasons Governor Ryan gave for his decision
to commute the sentences of everyone on Illinois' death row, mercy
as equity seems to have been his guiding theory.38 But even setting
aside the objection that mercy as equity is really a theory of justice
and not mercy, the theory fails on its own terms to justify a governor's
decision to commute the sentences of everyone on death row. An act
of mercy is justified on this theory if and when justice has not been
done, or perhaps when the process designed to secure a just result has
miscarried. But mass commutations extend mercy to everyone on
death row, not just to those who can credibly claim to have been
victims of injustice. One might say that distinguishing those who are
victims of injustice from those who are not is an impossible task.
Better, one might think, to err on the side of caution and commute
everyone's sentence, especially when an uncorrected mistake would
mean death for a guilty inmate who did not deserve death, or worse,
death for an innocent one.
But is mass commutation the best course of action in the face of
this uncertainty? Perhaps. Yet surely some of the inmates on a
state's death row, including some of those on Illinois' death row, were
fairly convicted of the offense that put them there, and surely some of
those deserved the sentence they received, if anyone ever does.39 If

so, then why not respond to the problem of uncertainty by shifting the
burden of proof to the state? Why not presume, despite the jury's
verdict and sentence, that everyone on death row is innocent and not
deserving of death? The state would then be forced to rebut those
presumptions with proof even stronger than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
One might insist that the state could never meet such a burden,
no matter what the facts of any particular case. But such a response
sounds as if it assumes the state can never prove death is a deserved
38. See Ryan, supra note 4.
39. It is worth noting that the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, which conducted the
dramatic public hearings preceding Governor Ryan's decision, recommended that the
Governor commute the death sentences of only ten inmates. See Ray Long, Clemency
Suggested for a Few Prisoners,CHI. TRIB., Jan. 1, 2003, § 2, at 1.
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punishment because death is always an undeserved punishment. Yet
if that is true, if death is always an undeserved and therefore unjust
punishment, then the relevant question is no longer about the
legitimate exercise of a governor's authority to grant mercy through
the exercise of clemency. The question is about a governor's
obligation to uphold an unjust law.
Governors may find mercy as equity to be the most politically
appealing basis on which to grant clemency to a particular death-row
inmate,' but mercy as equity offers no clear and convincing
justification for a governor's decision to commute the sentences of
everyone on death row in the name of mercy. Its power to persuade
depends on the assumption that the moral costs of securing justice by
taking each case one at a time outweigh the benefits of doing so.
Perhaps that assumption can be sustained. If not, then any
justification for a governor's decision to commute death row must be
found elsewhere.
B.

Mercy As Imperfect Obligation
Retribution's second theory of mercy, unlike its first, is a genuine
theory of mercy, not a theory of justice in disguise. On this theory,
mercy is a moral virtue separate and distinct from justice. It also
follows a separate and distinct moral logic. Mercy follows the logic of
an imperfect obligation. Justice follows that of a perfect obligation.41
Retributive justice requires an offender to be punished because
and to the extent, but only to the extent, he deserves to be punished.
Moreover, as a perfect obligation, retributive justice is subject to the
demands of equality. Like cases must be treated alike. Justice and
equality therefore work together. If an offender receives the
punishment he deserves, and if all those similarly situated receive the
punishment they deserve, then each offender will not only have been
treated justly, he will also have been treated equally compared to all
those similarly situated.
As an imperfect obligation independent of justice, mercy
conflicts with both justice and equality. As an independent obligation,
mercy conflicts with justice. Mercy tempers justice and therefore
40. See Daniel T. Kobil, How To Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L.
REV. 219,221-28 (2003).

41. For analyses of mercy as an imperfect obligation, see Kershnar, supra note 19, at
210-11; Murphy, supra note 17, at 181-83; Rainbolt, An Imperfect Virtue, supra note 19, at
171-72; Rainbolt, supra note 17, at 231-39. For a more detailed analysis of the logical
distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations, see George Rainbolt, Perfect and
Imperfect Obligations, 98 PHIL. STUD. 233,243 (2000).
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remits all or part of the punishment on which justice would otherwise
insist. As an imperfect obligation, mercy conflicts with equality. A
perfect obligation must be satisfied whenever it arises. An imperfect
obligation need only be satisfied on some occasions. So, if one
offender receives mercy because he is remorseful, mercy makes no
demand that the next offender, who is equally remorseful, also
receive mercy. Insisting on equality of treatment would undermine
mercy's gift-like quality. It would transform mercy into something it
is not-from an imperfect obligation into a perfect one.
Mercy is often associated with caprice.4 2 But we need to
understand the exact nature of mercy's caprice. We rightly expect
those empowered to grant mercy to do so for a reason, such as: the
offender is remorseful; he is in some sense a different person from the
one who committed the crime; he saved the life of a child in the
course of committing the crime; and so forth.4 3 The reasons we give
when we grant mercy are typically those that summon our sympathy
and compassion.'
Philosophers disagree about which reasons
properly belong to the domain of mercy and which properly belong to
the domain of justice and equity, but the important point here is that
mercy and justice both have reasons in support of them. Mercy is
capricious, not because it lacks the support of reasons, but because a
mercy-giver is not obligated always to act on those reasons. A mercygiver can, for reasons of his own (including mere political
expediency), grant mercy to one offender but deny it to another who
is otherwise similarly situated.
In addition, mercy's association with caprice should not be
confused with invidious discrimination.
The reasons mercy
legitimately countenances are those rightly tending to evoke our
sympathy and compassion. We can disagree about what those
reasons are, but in no event should they include a person's race,
42. See, e.g., Rainbolt, supra note 17, at 232 (claiming that imperfect obligations, like
the imperfect obligation to show mercy, are not "subject to the principle of sufficient
reason").
43. See Walker, supra note 19, at 32-35 (canvassing many of the reasons typically
offered in support of mercy). It is fairly common to hear that the relevance of an
offender's repentance with respect to how harshly he should be punished can be explained
only in terms of mercy, not retributive justice. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and
Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1501, 1526
(2000). But see Murphy, Repentance, supranote 19, at 79-85 (arguing that repentance may
be relevant to assessing an offender's deserved sentence whether one adopts what Murphy
labels "character retributivism" or "grievance retributivism").
44. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 17, at 166 ("Mercy is often regarded as found where
a judge, out of compassion for the plight of a particular offender, imposes upon that
offender a hardship less than his just deserts.").
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creed, or ethnicity.4 A mercy-giver could, if he wanted, flip a coin to
decide who among those eligible for mercy will receive it. Mercy can
tolerate such caprice. But it should not be understood to tolerate
invidious discrimination.
Treating mercy as an imperfect obligation frees it from the

demands of equality and accounts for mercy's gift-like quality. But
treating mercy as an imperfect obligation means an act of mercy is not
merely an act of supererogation. A supererogatory act is an act
above and beyond the call of duty. 46 Accordingly, a person's failure
to perform a genuinely supererogatory act does not leave him
vulnerable

to

moral

criticism.4 7

If

mercy

were

genuinely

supererogatory, a governor who never granted clemency would be
beyond moral criticism.

But we call those who never show mercy

"merciless," thereby intending to convey criticism. Consequently,

45. The available empirical analyses exploring the influence of race on clemency
decision-making in capital cases have not reached uniform conclusions. Compare
Margaret Vandiver, The Quality of Mercy: Race and Clemency in Florida Death Penalty
Cases, 1924-1966, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 315, 343 (1993) (finding race-of-defendant and
race-of-victim effects in pre-Furman capital cases in Florida, although acknowledging
results are based on "limited available data" and "restricted analysis"), with Michael
Heise, Mercy by the Numbers: An Empirical Analysis of Clemency and Its Structure, 89
VA. L. REV. 239, 281 (2003) (finding no race-of-defendant effect based on Bureau of
Justice Statistics data covering all post-Furman cases through 1999, although
acknowledging results are based on "data limitations [that] preclude more refined
analyses"), and William Alex Pridemore, An EmpiricalExamination of Commutations in
Post-Furman Capital Cases, 17 JUST. Q. 159, 175 (2000) (finding no race-of-defendant
effect based on Bureau of Justice Statistics data covering capital cases between 1994 and
1995). As a matter of existing constitutional doctrine, a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court have found that the way in which governors go about deciding to grant or
withhold clemency must meet some minimal level of procedural due process. See Ohio
Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288 (1998) (plurality opinion); id. at 290
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. This statement reflects what I understand to be the standard analysis of
supererogation. See DAVID HEYD, SUPEREROGATION: ITS STATUS IN ETHICAL
THEORY 115 (1982) (noting that the "omission [of a supererogatory act] is not wrong, and
does not deserve sanction or criticism-either formal or informal"); GREGORY
MELLEMA, BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY:
SUPEREROGATION, OBLIGATION, AND
OFFENSE 13 (1991) (noting that the "omission of [a supererogatory act] is not morally

blameworthy"). However, it might be more accurate to say that supererogatory acts are
acts above the call of deontic duty, but not above the call of aretaic duty. See, e.g., Heidi
M. Hurd, Duties Beyond the Call of Duty, 6 ANN. REV. LAW & ETHICS 3, 38 (1999)
(arguing that supererogatory acts are "aretaic duties" which "go beyond the call of deontic
duties" and which "concern virtuous character traits that we are obligated to cultivate, and
vicious character traits that we are obligated to suppress, over the course of our
lifetimes"); Gregory Trianosky, Supererogation, Wrongdoing,and Vice: On the Autonomy
of the Ethics of Virtue, 83 J. PHIL. 26, 29 (1986) (arguing that the failure to act
supererogatorily can attract no negative deontic judgments but can attract negative aretaic
judgments).
47. See Rainbolt, supra note 17, at 230.
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mercy's status as an obligation means an agent is obligated to show
mercy on at least some of the occasions calling for it, but its status as
an imperfect obligation means an agent is under no obligation to
show mercy on all such occasions.
The fact that mercy is an imperfect obligation, while justice is a
perfect one, does not mean justice must always trump mercy when the
two conflict. Our obligations can and do sometimes conflict, and
when they do we figure out as best we can how to proceed all things
considered. A long history of thought lends support to the claim that
mercy is a moral good.48 Consequently, insisting that justice must
always trump mercy is simply to deny mercy's status as a moral good
without offering any argument other than pointing to the fact that
mercy conflicts with justice. In other words, insisting that justice must
always trump mercy simply begs the question against mercy.49
Still, even if mercy should sometimes prevail against the
demands of justice, some argue that mercy should be confined to the
realm of private affairs." In the realm of public affairs mercy is a
vice. It is one thing, according to this argument, to show mercy
toward one another in our private dealings and so take less than we
are in justice entitled to take. It is another thing altogether for a state
actor to show mercy. Private citizens may be obligated to follow the
law, but they are not obligated to follow the rule of law. Where the
law imposes no obligation on them to act one way or the other,
private citizens are free to act as they please. But state actors, one
might argue, enjoy no such freedom. The rule of law always binds
state actors acting in their official capacities. They may never act on
whim. Yet if mercy permits acting on whim, then how can it be
reconciled with the rule of law to which state actors owe allegiance?
Some argue mercy and the rule of law cannot be reconciled.5 1
48. See, e.g., id. at 238 (examining philosophical arguments considering the question
of whether mercy is a moral good).
49. For thoughts on why mercy is properly considered a moral good, see Brien, Mercy
Within Legal Justice,supra note 17, at 106; Kershnar, supra note 19, at 211-15; Nussbaum,
supra note 19, at 101; Rainbolt, supra note 17, at 238; Rainbolt, Mercy and the Death
Penalty, supranote 19, at 14-19.
50. See Murphy, supra note 17, at 173-74 ("Judges in criminal cases are obligated to
do justice.... Let them keep their private sentimentality to themselves for use in their
private lives with their families and pets."). But cf id. at 179-80 (allowing that a "judge or
any other official may exercise mercy in a criminal case if... it can be shown that such an
official is acting, not on his own sentiments, but as a vehicle for all those who have been
victimized by the criminal").
51. See MOORE, supra note 19, at 192; Harrison, supra note 19, at 118; Dan Markel,
Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 31, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy and Craziness, 36 STAN. L.
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Accordingly, even if mercy binds us as private actors, it has no place
in the exercise of state power. If so, then executive clemency can only
legitimately be exercised under the banner of mercy as equity.
Others argue that the obligation to show mercy does not stop at the
statehouse door. 2 On this view, state actors, like private actors,
remain obligated to show mercy, at least from time to time.
Assuming for now that mercy as an imperfect obligation does
bind state actors, can mercy so understood justify a governor's
decision to commute death row? I am skeptical. At the outset, can it
be true that every inmate on a state's death row has a valid reason
supporting his plea for mercy? Maybe. Facing death, one might say,
is all the reason mercy needs, and everyone on death row is facing
death. Even so, the demands of mercy as an imperfect obligation are
limited. Those demands are fully satisfied if mercy is shown on some
of the occasions calling for it. It need not be shown on all such
occasions. If so, then mercy imposes no obligation on a governor to
commute the sentences of everyone on death row. However, one
might still argue that a governor is free to commute death row if he or
she so wishes.
Perhaps, but I am again skeptical. Keep in mind that the
imperfect obligation to show mercy always competes with the perfect
obligation to achieve retributive justice. As such, with every act of
mercy comes a corresponding denial of justice. At some point, so it
would seem, the demands of justice must prevail against those of
mercy. Therefore, at some point short of the last commutation, it
would be wrong for a governor to commute another death sentence.
While mercy may obligate a governor to commute some death
sentences, justice obligates him not to commute them all.
Consequently, any decision to commute all of death row would be too
much of a good thing-too much mercy, too little justice. 3
III. ATONEMENT'S MERCY
The two theories of mercy discussed thus far situate mercy within
a retributive theory of punishment.5 4 Mercy as equity treats mercy as
REV. 1485, 1509 (1984) (book review).
52. See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 19, at 1472 (endorsing state mercy); Rainbolt, Mercy
and the Death Penalty, supra note 19, at 14-20 (same).
53. See, e.g., Rainbolt, Mercy and the Death Penalty, supra note 19, at 20-21
("[B]ecause mercy is an imperfect virtue, state mercy necessarily involves a certain degree
of arbitrariness, of unfairness, of injustice. So too much state mercy would cause too much
injustice.").
54. See supra Part II.
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a way of achieving retributive justice (and thus reduces mercy to that
form of justice called equity). Mercy as imperfect obligation treats
mercy as an independent virtue tempering the demands of retributive
justice. Neither theory can, for the reasons I have suggested, easily
justify a governor's decision to commute the sentences of everyone on
death row in the name of mercy. Another theory of punishment,
which I have elsewhere called punishment as atonement, 56 perhaps
can justify such a decision.
A.

Retribution and Atonement

Retribution holds that punishment is justified because and only
because it is deserved, and only to the extent it is deserved.57
Retribution therefore has no end beyond itself. Its only end is doing
justice, and justice is done when deserved punishment is imposed.
The difficult task for retributivists has long been to explain how the
mere fact that a person deserves punishment can justify punishing
them. 58 That question deserves a good answer, but for now I will
simply assume that retributivists can supply one.59
Retribution is usually contrasted with utilitarianism. Utilitarian
theories of punishment identify some end toward which punishment
is a means, such as the deterrence of future criminal wrongdoing or
the rehabilitation of the wrongdoer.' Punishment is then justified if
and only if it happens to be the cheapest or most efficient means to
that end.61 Utilitarianism sees the relationship between punishment
and its avowed end as contingent.6' If a cheaper or more efficient
means is available to achieve the same end, then punishment is no
longer the best tool for the job and the justification for imposing it
vanishes.
55. See supra Part II.
56. For a more complete discussion of many of the claims that follow, see generally
Stephen P. Garvey, Punishmentas Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801 (1999).
57. See, e.g., Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) ("A

retributivist punishes because, and only because, the offender deserves it.").
58. See David Dolinko, Some Thoughts on Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 545-59
(1991) (pressing this question hard against three recent and prominent theories of
retributivism and concluding that none of them provides a persuasive answer).
59. Among the recent efforts to answer this question, I would commend in particular
the works of Jean Hampton and Michael Moore. See Jean Hampton, An Expressive
Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Wesley Cragg ed., 1992);
Moore, supra note 57, at 179-219.
60. See Duff, supra note 20, at 4.
61. See id. at 4-5.
62. See id. at 5.
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Atonement is distinct from both retribution and utilitarianism.
Unlike retribution, atonement posits an end for punishment beyond
punishment itself. It holds that deserved punishment is justified
because it forms a necessary part of a larger process through which an
offender atones for his offense, a process leading ideally to the
reconciliation of the offender and those he wronged. Reconciliation
or atonement is the end toward which punishment is a means. Unlike
utilitarianism, atonement sees the relationship between punishment
and its end as necessary, not merely contingent. Punishment is not
simply one among other possible ways of achieving the end in view.
It is the only way.
Punishment
as
atonement
presupposes
a
particular
understanding of what it is that makes a crime a crime. A crime is not
simply an act that causes another person material injury. While
crimes often do cost people money or injure them physically, they
also entail a distinctive form of moral injury. This distinctive moral
injury manifests itself in symbolic or expressive terms. Simply put, an
actor who commits a crime shows contempt for the law and for his
victim. This expression of contempt damages the relationship of trust
and mutual respect previously presumed to exist between the
offender and his victim, thereby damaging the social bond between
them, though not to the breaking point.63
Thinking about punishment as an integral part of a process
leading to atonement provides a picture of how punishment operates
in a genuine community, one in which offender and victim share that
degree of trust and respect upon which communal existence
depends.' When one member of such a community commits a crime
against another, he forfeits his good standing as a member of the
community and acquires the burden of guilt. In order to reclaim his
good standing and expiate the guilt he has acquired, he must take
certain steps to make amends. His first step is to make reparations
and thereby make the victim whole in a material sense.
His next step is to make the victim whole in a moral sense. He
must pay to repair the moral injury he has caused, and the medium
through which he makes this payment is not a check or other mode of
material compensation. Instead, he pays for the moral injury of his
63. I realize that not all acts for which a person can be convicted of a crime convey
this message of insult or contempt. See id. at 37; Stephen P. Garvey, Two Kinds of
CriminalWrongs, 5 PUNISHMENT & SoC'Y 279, 281-83 (2003) (distinguishing two kinds of
criminal wrongs, only one of which conveys a message of insult or contempt).
Nonetheless, crimes punishable by death surely do convey such a message.
64. See Garvey, supra note 56, at 1810, 1854.
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crime through his willing submission to the punishment he deserves.
His punishment therefore sheds its character as punishment. It
becomes a form of secular penance. Once he makes reparations and
serves his penance-once he repairs the material and moral damage
he has caused-the offender will at last have succeeded in doing all he

can to expiate the guilt of his offense. He will have earned his return
ticket back into the community as a member in good standing.
At that point, the burden of atonement shifts to the victim, who
in light of the offender's genuine efforts to make amends, must
assume a difficult obligation. He must forgive and overcome the
anger and resentment he rightly felt toward the offender for the
wrong he suffered at the offender's hands.65 Or more precisely, he
must at least try to forgive.66

He must undertake the hard work

needed to set the stage for forgiveness. If his efforts succeed, both he
and the offender receive the gift of forgiveness,67 and with forgiveness

the victim's resentment lifts. The circle is complete. Victim and
offender are returned to where they were before the crime damaged
their relationship.
The theory of punishment as atonement is of course an ideal
theory. How many real-life offenders repent and willingly submit to
their punishment? How many real-life victims try to forgive?
Atonement is often unrealized in the real world. The state can still
65. Here I take a stronger stand on the deontic status of forgiveness toward an
offender who has expiated his guilt than I previously expressed, see Garvey, supra note 56,
at 1851; Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH
L. REV. 303, 315. I now think a victim would be wrong to forgive an offender who has
done nothing at all-not even apologize-to expiate the guilt of his offense. Forgiveness
under these circumstances would, it seems, be inconsistent with an adequate sense of selfrespect on the part of the victim and would express, or come close to expressing,
condonation of the offense. Conversely, it would be wrong (though perhaps excusable)
for a victim not to forgive an offender who has done everything he can to expiate the guilt
of his offense. Failing to (try to) forgive under these circumstances shows an insufficient
concern for the value of community on which the theory of punishment as atonement is
premised. In other words, the victim begins with an obligation not to forgive, but that
obligation is transformed into its opposite-an obligation to forgive-once an offender
accomplishes all that he must in order to expiate his guilt.
I would characterize forgiving an offender who has done some, but not all, of the
work needed to expiate his guilt as an act of supererogation, although others have argued
or suggested that it should be characterized as an act discharging an imperfect obligation.
See JORAM GRAF HABER, FORGIVENESS 102-03 (1991); Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and
Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY, supra note 17, at 29-30.
66. The victim's obligation is to try to forgive, because while trying to forgive is within
a victim's control, forgiveness itself is not. See Morris, supra note 19, at 19.
67. See id. ("Forgiveness is, at once, a gift to the forgiven and to the forgiver," which
"makes understandable why some have seen the hand of God in forgiveness as they have
in the grace that allows one to have faith without grounds for belief.").
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legitimately punish an unrepentant offender, but its warrant for doing
so comes from retribution, not from atonement. Atonement is
nonetheless the standard against which our existing practices of
punishment should be measured and the ideal toward which they
should aspire. Compared to atonement, retribution is a second-best.
B.

Death,Mercy, and Atonement
Having described atonement and its relationship to retribution,
let me return to the idea of mercy. What role does mercy play in
atonement? Does the role of mercy in atonement differ from its role
in retribution? When an offender's deserved punishment is less than
death, the answer is no. But when death an offender's deserved
punishment is death, the answer is yes. For when an offender's
deserved punishment is death, mercy can serve a role above and
beyond the roles it can serve in retribution.
First, compare the role of mercy in atonement with its role in
retribution when the punishment an offender deserves is something
less than death. Begin with retribution's first theory of mercy, mercy
as equity. Understood as a form of equity, mercy ensures for
retribution that no offender is punished unjustly. Mercy can and
should play a similar role for atonement. Like retribution, atonement
requires an offender to endure his deserved punishment, but no more
than his deserved punishment. Consequently, mercy as equity would
advance the cause of atonement in the same way it would advance the
cause of retributive justice.
Next, consider retribution's second theory of mercy, mercy as
imperfect obligation.
Understood as an imperfect obligation
independent of retributive justice, the (imperfect) obligation to show
mercy inevitably conflicts with the (perfect) obligation to do
retributive justice. This conflict presents proponents of retribution
with a choice: Should the state occasionally temper justice with
mercy, in which case justice will sometimes be denied, or should it
never do so, in which case the state becomes merciless? Devout
retributivists will side with justice and argue that justice should never
be denied. Less devout retributivists will side with mercy and
conclude that mercy should sometimes be permitted to temper the
demands of justice.
Mercy as an imperfect obligation presents the same choice
mutatis mutandis to proponents of atonement. Recall that a victim's
obligation to forgive arises only when the offender has endured the
full measure of his deserved penance. An offender who receives
mercy will endure less than his full penance; consequently, his victim
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will never bear an obligation to forgive. Yet without forgiveness,
there can be no reconciliation. Mercy therefore seems to preclude
reconciliation.
But extending mercy to an offender does not necessarily
preclude reconciliation. A victim may try to forgive an offender even
if the offender has not served his full penance. Yet any such effort
would not be undertaken in fulfillment of a duty to forgive. On the
contrary, it would be supererogatory. The choice mercy as an
imperfect obligation presents to atonement therefore comes down to
this: Should the state occasionally temper justice with mercy, in
which case atonement will depend on the supererogation of victims,
or should it never do so, in which case the state becomes merciless?
In short, when the punishment an offender deserves is something
less than death, mercy can perform more or less the same roles in
atonement as it can in retribution. But when the punishment an
offender deserves is death, the picture changes. Assuming for present
purposes that death is indeed the deserved punishment for some
horrible crimes, retribution treats death just as it would any other
form of deserved punishment. 6 As such, when death is not in fact the
punishment an offender deserves, a governor should commute his
death sentence in the name of mercy as equity. A governor should
also, from time to time, commute some death sentences in the name
of mercy as imperfect obligation, assuming he believes a merciful
(though not perfectly just) state is preferable on balance to a
merciless (though perfectly just) one.
In contrast, atonement does not treat death just like any other
punishment.69 Indeed, when the penance an offender must endure to
expiate the guilt of his offense is death, the theory of atonement finds
itself with a dilemma: if the offender submits to his deserved penance
and is executed, then reconciliation between the offender and the
68. Compare Mary E. Gale, Retribution, Punishment and Death, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.

REV. 973, 1028 (1985) ("[I]f at the instant of the infliction of the punishment the offender
is rendered forever unable to appreciate the justness of her punishment, much if not all of
its [retributive] moral force is lost."), with Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment:
A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1669 (1986) ("Execution ... is ... the only fitting

retribution for murder I can think of.").
69. I recognize that life imprisonment also precludes atonement insofar as the victim
of an offense deserving of life imprisonment is obligated to (try to) forgive the offender
only when the offender fulfills his penance, which he does only at the time of his death.
But whereas an offender sentenced to life imprisonment begins serving his penance from
the moment he is incarcerated, an offender sentenced to death begins (and ends) his
penance only at the moment of his death. Consequently, life imprisonment allows a victim
supererogatorily to forgive an offender sentenced to life imprisonment in response to the
offender's partial fulfillment of his penance. Death makes no such allowance.
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victim's family becomes impossible. The offender is dead. But if the
offender does not submit to his deserved penance, then reconciliation
is likewise impossible, unless the victim's family forgives the offender
without the offender having served his full penance. Yet such
forgiveness is an act of supererogation which neither the offender nor
the state has any right to demand.
The argument might be made that this dilemma should be
resolved in death's favor for at least two reasons. First, one might
argue that death and atonement are not in fact at odds with one
another. Perhaps reconciliation between an offender and the victim's
family can only occur in the final and dramatic moment just before
the defendant's death, and if it does not, then at least justice will have
been served. Or, perhaps atonement can only be achieved in some
way through the offender's death. Either way, atonement is not only
compatible with death but actually requires it.
Second, even if one agrees that death and atonement are
incompatible, one might argue that the horrific nature of capital
crimes makes atonement a goal not worth pursuing in such cases.
Perhaps capital crimes make atonement undesirable because such
crimes should be seen as unforgivable.
Far from being
supererogatory, forgiving them would actually be wrong. In other
words, capital crimes not only damage the social bond, they break it.
Indeed, one might say that breaking the social bond is precisely what
makes a crime a capital crime. In any event, if capital crimes make
atonement an undesirable goal, then doing justice-and executing the
offender-is the only thing left to do.
I find neither of these arguments persuasive. First, atonement
should not be understood as aiming at some fleeting reconciliation
gained in the moment before the defendant's death, nor at some
quasi-theological reconciliation gained thereafter. On the contrary,
atonement should be understood as aiming at an enduring and secular
form of reconciliation in which offender and victim participate in the
here and now. Second, atonement should be understood to insist that
no crime, not even a capital one, forever shuts the door to the
possibility of reconciliation, however remote it might seem.70 Indeed,
the families of at least some murder victims have made the
supererogatory effort needed to let go of their anger, achieving
70. See R.A. Duff, Penance, Punishment and the Limits of Community, 5
PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 295, 306 (2003) ("I am fairly confident that ... no single deed,
however terrible, should put a person beyond civic redemption."); Trudy Govier,
Forgiveness and the Unforgivable, 36 AM. PHIL. Q. 59, 71 (1999) ("I submit that no one is
absolutely unforgivable, whatever he or she may have done in this world.").
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forgiveness and thereby a measure of peace and closure perhaps
unknowable to those who demand justice.71
We return then to the dilemma death presents to atonement:
reconciliation is impossible if the offender is executed, but it is also
impossible if he is not executed, unless of course the victim's family
acts beyond the call of duty. Now, what does all this have to do with
mercy? The answer is simple: mercy is one response to this dilemma.
Extending mercy and remitting an offender's death sentence reflects a
choice to preserve the possibility of reconciliation between victim and
offender. In other words, extending mercy to death-sentenced
offenders can be justified, not simply as a way to achieve equity or to
satisfy the demands of an imperfect obligation, but also as a way to
preserve the possibility of atonement. Moreover, unlike either of the
theories available to retribution, this theory of mercy can explain why
a governor's decision to commute the sentences of everyone on death
row is a morally defensible one.
For the devout retributivist, the mass commutation of death row
is an unmitigated moral disaster. Justice has not been done, and
showing mercy does nothing to offset that moral cost. Yet even for
retributivists who are prepared to allow mercy to sometimes temper
justice, mass commutation is too much of a good thing. Mercy is a
virtue, but it always comes at a price. Each act of mercy entails a
denial of the justice retribution demands. At some point the moral
costs of mercy will begin to outweigh its moral benefits. Mercy must
then retreat and allow justice to prevail. Mass commutations ignore
this moral calculus and deny justice its due.
The corresponding moral calculus is different for atonement. In
the calculus of atonement, each extension of mercy to an offender
under a deserved sentence of death still carries a cost, since the
offender will not have served his full penance. But for atonement,
unlike for retribution, each act of mercy also carries an offsetting
benefit-the possibility of reconciliation. Such reconciliation can
only be achieved if victims find it within themselves to search for
forgiveness even though they have no obligation to do so. The state
has no right to expect such supererogatory forgiveness; nonetheless, it
should be free to preserve the possibility of such forgiveness and thus
the possibility of atonement.
Moreover, if the possibility of
71. See, e.g., RACHEL KING, DON'T KILL IN OUR NAMES: FAMILIES OF MURDER
VICTIMS SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2003) (collecting personal

accounts of members of Murder Victims' Families for Reconciliation, who "reject the
concept of retribution and believe that no one is beyond redemption").
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atonement is enough to offset the injustice accruing with each act of
mercy, then the primary obstacle to commuting all of death row
disappears. For if the possibility of atonement exists for any inmate
on death row, it exists for them all.
On this theory a governor's decision to commute all of death row
is morally permissible. But it is not morally obligatory. The problem
with saying a governor is obligated on this theory to commute all of
death row comes out in the following question: Is it better to achieve
retributive justice at the expense of atonement, or is it better to
preserve some possibility of atonement at the expense of certain
justice?
I see no clear-cut answer to that question. 72 Consequently, no

option is foreclosed. A governor could deny mercy to everyone on
death row if he or she saw fit to do so. 73

Or a governor could

commute the death sentences of some, but not of others.

Or a

governor could do as Governor Ryan did, commuting the sentences

of everyone.
CONCLUSION

I began with the following question: Is it morally justified for a
governor to commute all of death row in the name of mercy? My
answer is yes. Mass commutation is morally permissible. But one can
reach that conclusion, I suggest, only if one abandons retribution in
favor of atonement.
Neither theory of mercy available to retribution can justify a
decision to commute the sentences of every inmate on death row.
Mercy as equity might be able to justify a decision to commute the
72. I could be wrong on this score in three different ways. First, I could be wrong
because the balance is always in favor of certain justice. If so, then it would be wrong for a
governor to commute any death sentence. Second, I could be wrong because the balance
is always in favor of preserving the possibility of atonement. If so, then it would be wrong
for a governor to refuse to commute any death sentence. Third, I could be wrong because,
depending on the facts of the particular case, the balance sometimes favors certain justice
and sometimes favors preserving the possibility of atonement. If so, then it would be
wrong for a governor to commute all death sentences and wrong to commute none of
them. Whether a governor should commute any particular death sentence will depend on
the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In any event, if I am wrong, then a
governor will be obligated, as the case may be, to commute some death sentences, none of
them, or all of them. He will not enjoy the moral freedom to choose among these options.
But if that is right, then mercy would lose its gift-like quality, for a governor would,
depending on the circumstances, be morally obligated to grant or withhold mercy.
73. Such a governor must nevertheless occasionally commute individual death
sentences in order to discharge the imperfect obligation to show mercy, assuming state
actors have such an obligation.
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sentences of everyone on death row in the name of justice, but not in
the name of mercy. Mercy as imperfect Obligation can justify a
decision to commute the sentences of some on death row in the name
of mercy, but not the sentences of them all. With each act of mercy
comes a corresponding injustice until at some point the demands of
justice must prevail against those of mercy.
The moral logic changes when one switches from retribution to
atonement.
For atonement, unlike for retribution, deserved
punishment is not an end in itself. It is merely a means, although a
necessary means, to the end of reconciliation. But when the
punishment an offender deserves is death, the means and end of
atonement come apart. Death precludes the possibility of atonement,
but without death atonement depends on the supererogatory
forgiveness of victims. What to do? Commute or not commute?
The answer, I think, is properly delegated to the conscience. A
governor is free to do as he or she in good faith sees fit. A governor is
free to commute the death sentences of all, some, or none of those on
death row in mercy's name. But if a governor chooses to commute
the sentences of everyone on death row, such a choice can be
understood as a morally permissible act of mercy only if we abandon
retribution and embrace atonement.
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